US-Pakistan ties have been in a downward spiral since the beginning of this year, but now they seem to be in free fall. The Pakistani state insists on playing the injured victim and betrayed ally card, both for domestic consumption and as an oft-overused bargaining tool. And the US administration appears to have become impatient with an always-complaining ally who is reluctant to face reality.
US-Pakistan relations have always had a see-saw nature. So at one level the current frictions in the relationship are not surprising.

Pakistan insists on playing the betrayed ally card, and the US administration appears to have become impatient

As I show in my book (“Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India”) Pakistan has always looked to the US as a country who would bolster Pakistan’s meager resources – both economic and military – in order to help Pakistan achieve parity with India. Pakistan also hoped for American assistance in any conflict with India. From the US perspective, however, Pakistan was one of the cogs in the wheel in the ‘northern tier of containment’ against the Soviet Union during the Cold War and a frontline ally against terrorism after 9/11. While the US provided immense amounts of economic and military aid, American administrations did not support Pakistan during any of its conflicts with India. Also, during the last two decades ties between India and the US have grown in many areas.

The bedrock of Pakistan’s ties with the US has always been the security relationship, the military-to-military ties and the intelligence relationship between the two countries. Through the 1960s, 70s and especially during the 1980s, there were very close ties. Top American military officials like former chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, and former CENTCOM commander and current CIA chief General David Petraeus, have tried to build ties with Pakistan because of their own positive experiences in the past. However, starting in the 1990s, the ties began to weaken.

In the past, Pakistan was the only American ally in the sub-continent and the US often viewed the region from the Pakistani prism. That is no longer the case. The US now has a stake in the future of India and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s insistence on brinkmanship may result in the US viewing Pakistan from the Indian and Afghan prisms

When they were rebuilt after 9/11, the American military-intelligence establishment saw what they perceived as duplicitous behavior. Pakistan was an ally in the war on terror and had provided its territory and troops for assistance to the American-led international forces in Afghanistan. And yet, the Pakistani state’s allowing of ‘safe havens’ within its border and use of jihadi groups as proxies – like the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and their allies – hurt American interests and American lives.

The mistrust in the American security establishment is deepening. The raid that killed Osama Bin Laden and repeated instances of cross-border violations by both American Special Operations Forces and NATO helicopters has to be seen in this context. When we read the statement by now retired Admiral Mullen, that the Haqqani network was “a veritable arm of the ISI”, we would do well to remember that Admiral Mullen made over 27 trips to Pakistan to meet with General Kayani and other Pakistani officials.

The mistrust is also visible in the response to the latest NATO attack on the Afghan-Pakistan border. Both sides have their own versions of the incident. Pakistan has closed its land borders to NATO supplies and there is no sign yet on when they will re-open.

According to Pakistan Premier Yousaf Raza Gilani, “business as usual” would not be possible and “the democratic government would not allow similar attack on the country’s sovereignty, and any (such) attempt in future will definitely meet the detrimental response”. Pakistan’s army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has reportedly ordered his troops to respond to any violations of the border without waiting for orders from above. Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) Major General Ashfaq Nadeem referred to the incident as a “pre-planned conspiracy” by “supposed allies”.

NATO insists that the incident was “not a deliberate” violation. Instead of trying to go further in order to placate Pakistan, the American military establishment has tried to demonstrate that they are not as dependent on Pakistan’s logistical support as is made out to be. Further, while Pakistan has closed the land borders to NATO supplies, its air space is still open for use by NATO and the Americans. If Pakistan closed its air space as well, that would increase the problems for the US.

But US ties with Russia and the Central Asian states are not like they were during the 1960s, 70s or 80s.

While there are areas in which they disagree, Russia has allowed the US to operate the northern route to supply its troops in Afghanistan. The longer, and more often, Pakistan closes its borders, the less leverage it will have, as the US will turn more and more to the northern route and even try other routes.

Ties between the civilian elements of both countries leave much to be desired. The Obama administration has repeatedly tried to bolster the civilian side of the Pakistani state both through the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill as well as by assistance in bolstering Pakistan’s weak economy. During every crisis, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton calls or visits Pakistan to calm things down. President Obama too called his Pakistani counterpart President Asif Ali Zardari to condole on the deaths of the Pakistani soldiers killed in the NATO strike.

However, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the American administration to ask for more assistance for Pakistan at a time when the mood in the Congress is becoming more and more anti-Pakistan. Soon after the NATO strikes, two leading Republican senators, John McCain and Lindsey Graham, called for a “full review” of ties with Pakistan stating that “US policy toward Pakistan must proceed from the realistic understanding that certain actions of Pakistan’s military are contributing to the death and injury of our men and women in the military and jeopardizing our national security interests.”

Pakistan and aid to Pakistan has been a key topic of discussion at all Republican presidential debates.

In this context, it is unfortunate that Pakistan has lost one of their best interlocutors with the Americans, the former Pakistani ambassador to US Husain Haqqani.

The Pakistani state has often played the game of brinkmanship – or as an American analyst recently said, “Russian roulette” – with its neighbor India. Attempting to play this game with the Americans may prove problematic, or disastrous. Pakistan’s security establishment, especially its army, has been attempting to regain what it lost during the Musharraf years.

While the government is civilian, the army still has a say in foreign policy, defence and security policy, economic policy and even in domestic politics. Pakistan’s army has always portrayed itself as the champion or protector of Pakistan’s “ideological and territorial frontiers”. While the army still remains “India-centric” – as General Kayani has often stated – it is much easier to gain public approval by “standing up to the US” these days than by standing up to India. It is in this context that we need to read the army becoming more turf conscious domestically (not allowing ISI to be under civilian control, for instance) as well as internationally (resisting the American attempt to boost civilian supremacy over the military, and championing of the ‘sovereignty’ issue).

Today we face problems in all aspects of the US-Pakistan relationship. On the American side there is, as always, a lack of a unified consistent policy by all segments of the American administration. In previous decades, the security establishment was the bedrock. Today, those ties still remain but there are deepening cracks in the edifice. With growing mistrust, there is increasing reliance on and likelihood of more drone strikes, Special Forces operations across the border in ‘hot pursuit’ of jihadis, and covert operations within Pakistan. 

While the State Department and White House are still committed to the Pakistani relationship and would like to see a ‘stable, democratic Pakistan’, there are signs of growing American impatience with the civilian leadership.

On the Pakistani side, the civilians are not strong enough and often use the ‘American card’ to play to a domestic audience which is 83% anti-American, according to the latest polls. The Pakistani military-intelligence establishment – increasingly comprised of the Zia generation and the ‘lost generation’ (more ideologically Islamist and anti-American) – sees the issues of ‘ghairat’ (honour) and ‘sovereignty’ as critical, if it has to maintain its legitimacy and status at home.

What Pakistan’s civilian and military establishments fail to understand is that this is not the 1960s or 1970s or the 1980s. During those decades, Pakistan was the only American ally in the sub-continent and the US often viewed the region from the Pakistani prism. That is no longer the case. There are American troops in Afghanistan and the US has a stake in Afghanistan’s future. America’s ties with India have deepened in the last two decades and the US also has a stake in India’s stability and future.

Pakistan’s insistence on brinkmanship instead of a negotiated resolution of differences may result in the worst nightmare of its establishment: the US viewing Pakistan from the Indian and Afghan prisms.

Close and friendly ties between the US and Pakistan benefit not only these two countries but the entire region and beyond. For the US, good ties with Pakistan are important not only because it has troops in Afghanistan, but also because stability in the region depends on stability in Pakistan. While walking away from Pakistan and the region is an option, it would not help the US in the long term. And neither would it help other countries in the region – India, Afghanistan and China.

While the Obama administration has tried to change the policy followed by the previous administrations and attempted to boost the civilian side of the Pakistani state, there is more that can be done. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill and other American assistance to Pakistan has the potential to boost the civil society, rebuild the broken education system, provide energy assistance and eventually build a civilian democratic Pakistan. Pakistan is much more than just its civilian and security establishments and there is a need for genuine people-to-people interaction and partnerships.

It is Pakistan that will suffer from any further breakdown of ties with the US. It is dependent upon external assistance not just for its economy but also for energy and education, and American assistance and support is critical in this respect.

Any more conflict with US, especially over Afghanistan, will only hurt Pakistan. Brinkmanship with a country that has the capability but not yet the desire or goal to cause harm is not pragmatic. As the Urdu proverb goes: whether the knife falls on the melon or the melon on the knife, the melon suffers.

Pakistan: A Personal History
By Imran Khan
Bantam Press; Pp 390; Rs 995

 Read this quote to a young Pakistani, and it would almost instinctively be identified as coming from the country’s Islamising military dictator, General Ziaul Haq: “Pakistan came into existence as a country because of Islam and the Islamic beliefs of its founders and citizens.” Ziaul Haq expressed the same thought but somewhat differently: “The ideology of Pakistan is Islam and only Islam. There should be no misunderstanding on this score. We should in all sincerity accept Islam as Pakistan’s basic ideology…otherwise…this country (will) be exposed to secular ideologies.” The first quote, however, comes from Pakistan’s latest media icon of ‘change’, Oxford-educated cricket legend Imran Khan who is finally gaining some traction in Pakistan’s treacherous political world after a fringe role for over 15 years.

Imran Khan’s personal memoir is replete with examples of how he represents a continuum in Pakistan’s non-secular establishment worldview while talking of change. Ziaul Haq’s fervent anti-secular admonishment quoted above was itself just an attempt to revive the religion-based nationalism introduced by an earlier military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan. Ziaul Haq felt the secularists had gained ground in the aftermath of Pakistan’s division in 1971. His idiom of ‘change’, ‘accountability’ and disapproval for traditional politicians is uncannily similar to what Ayub Khan voiced in the 1960s and Imran Khan is articulating now.

Not to belabour the point, just compare the above quotes from Imran Khan and Ziaul Haq with this gem from Ayub Khan: “Such an ideology with us is obviously that of Islam. It was on that basis that we fought for and got Pakistan, but having got it, we failed to order our lives in accordance with it…The time has now come when we must…define this ideology in simple but modern terms and put it to the people, so that they can use it as a code of guidance.”

Imran Khan’s political views have obviously been shaped by the narrative of the military dictators under whom he grew up. He betrays an unusual tendency to believe popular conspiracy theories of the variety popularised by Pakistan’s hyper-nationalists, such as some groups of newspapers and the religious political parties, notably the Jamaat-e-Islami. He blames the Americans for most of what has gone wrong with Pakistan. The references to conspiracies starts almost at the beginning of the book with the mention of the assassination of the country’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, on page 23 and the ‘mysterious’ air crash that killed Ziaul Haq on pages 124-125. At a time when an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis believes that 9/11 was part of an American conspiracy to justify attacking Muslim lands, Imran Khan’s predilection for conspiracy theories, though dangerous, might reflect the populist mood of the country.

Like others before him Imran tries to create a pseudo-intellectual justification for his anti-Americanism. He draws a parallel between the British rule in the subcontinent and the lack of sovereignty of British India’s princely states with the current relationship between Pakistan and the US. Ironically, Ayub Khan, towards the end of his decade-long regime had called on the Americans to be Pakistan’s “friends, not masters” and Ziaul Haq had complained days before his death about the US not allowing him space to reap the benefits of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan as part of the same national narrative.

On page 48 after criticising Pakistan’s English-medium schooling — of which he was a recipient for decades — and tying it to a form of neo-colonialism, Imran Khan states that in other post-colonial countries like India the government imposed one core syllabus on the entire country. A little research would have told Khan that this assertion is not true — there are two federal level systems (ICSE and CBSE) and every state in India has its own state board of education. Also, instead of doing away with English education or English schooling, India has helped deepen it further in the last six decades and benefitted from it. In a country with many languages, the English language has proved to be a unifying, not divisive, element. But such factual quibbles have little value for the ideological paradigm Khan embraces. Narratives get votes, facts do not.

Continuing with what he perceives as the long-term adverse impact of colonialism, Imran Khan also asserts that this has prevented people from wearing their traditional dress (shalwar kameez) and they continue to wear western dress (pg 51). There is no effort at determining what percentage of Pakistanis actually wore shalwar kameez before the advent of colonial rule or after independence. Had it been undertaken, Imran Khan would have discovered that in most of what is Pakistan today, various forms of dress, including dhoti or lungi (loose loincloth), may have been more common than shalwar kameez.

Imran Khan does not even attempt an anthropological or sociological inquiry while making sweeping claims. Culture for him is skin deep and depends on outward displays — what we wear or the language we speak — and not on core values and traditions. There is also no attempt to answer an obvious question: If Imran Khan is really so against the English language and education why has he published his book in English using a British publisher in London and not in Urdu through a Pakistani one?

While talking about the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad Mr Khan’s views resonate the views of Pakistan’s foreign and security establishments — that the mujahideen were created and funded by the Americans for their foreign policy goals and Pakistan was an unwilling victim (pg 70). That Mr Khan sympathised with the mujahideen and their views is apparent from his referring to them as “idealists” fighting for a “romantic” reason and stating that “jihad is a noble cause (pg 70).” His admiration for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Osama bin Laden too is evident when he refers to them as people “fighting foreign occupiers” and “sacrificing a life of luxury” (pg 72). Like the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, Mr Khan preferred the 1980s arrangement between the ISI and the CIA to the post-9/11 arrangement. “However, unlike Musharraf after 9/11, Zia never allowed the CIA to spread its network within Pakistan. It was the ISI who trained the militant groups, funded by the CIA.” Pakistan’s sovereignty, he seems to be arguing, was protected by Zia but sacrificed by Musharraf though how the country could retain complete independence by allowing a foreign intelligence agency’s massive covert operation on its soil remains unexplained.

After declaring Islam as the basis of Pakistani nationhood, Imran Khan ventures into some discussion of the faith. But the only two Muslim scholars mentioned in his book are Shah Waliullah and Muhammad Iqbal, one with violent sectarian revivalist views and the other a modern-educated Muslim exhorting Muslims to find a new path in an era of western domination. Imran Khan does not seem to know how Shah Waliullah contributed to sectarian division in South Asian Islam by his opposition to heresies and his calls for war against the Shias. For the Oxford-educated cricketer, Shah Waliullah’s views enable him to claim that just as the Mughal dynasty declined because it was “degenerative and bound to decay” all the democracies in the Muslim world today are “sham democracies” and are bound to fall (pg 79).

Playing to the Islamist-nationalist gallery in Pakistan, Imran Khan goes on to argue for an Islamic state and implementation of shariah as that is bound to ensure a just democratic welfare state (pp 80-81). A cursory reading of the 1953 report by the Justice Munir Commission would have enlightened Khan on the problems of defining Islam for purposes of governance — a point that Ziaul Haq also occasionally cited as reason for his inability to complete Pakistan’s Islamisation. “Keeping in view the several definitions given by the ulema [people of knowledge],” the Munir Commission pointed out, “need we make any comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental. If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine has done and that definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously go out of the fold of Islam. And if we adopt the definition given by any one of the ulema, we remain Muslims according to the view of that aalim [learned scholar] but kafirs [infidels] according to the definition of everyone else.”

Although Imran Khan does not like him, his book is remarkably similar to the one by General Pervez Musharraf. Both books have a surfeit of self-praise. Musharraf attempted to portray himself as the school bully turned army commando turned self-proclaimed saviour of Pakistan. Imran Khan comes out as someone who lived a hedonistic lifestyle all his life but is now trying to make up for it. His love for his mother, pride in family roots, love for cricket and constant quotations from Iqbal seem all too contrived. His attempt to show how he may not have been an observant Muslim in his youth but has become one in later years is too self-serving.

Throughout the book Imran Khan is not only disparaging about Pakistan’s politicians but also about the field of politics (pg 82). One wonders how he plans to do well in a field that he hates so much. One of his many criticisms of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif is that these individuals did not have enough political and administrative experience before they entered office and hence they were bound to fail. But then he acknowledges that he does not have any experience in politics but it would be akin to swimming where after jumping in he learnt on the job (pg 186). If that is the case then why could not others too learn on the job and do equally well, if not better? And if it is not possible to learn on the job and prior experience is a must, how would Imran Khan do better?

Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s recent trip to India portends a new development. During the visit, the two countries signed a ‘strategic partnership’ pact which entailed agreements on counter-terrorism cooperation, training of Afghan security forces and increased trade.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s statement portrayed India’s vision of ties with Afghanistan with the emphasis on both the old historical ties as well as the newer strategic ones. “Our cooperation with Afghanistan is an open book. We have civilizational links, and we are both here to stay. India will stand by the people of Afghanistan as they prepare to assume the responsibility for their governance and security after the withdrawal of international forces in 2014.”

The recent pact is supposed to create “an institutional framework” for using existing ties to build for the future. Currently India is one of the largest donors to Afghanistan, providing around $2 billion in aid which has mainly been focused on economic and development-related issues.

For the last decade, mainly in order to assuage Pakistan, U.S. requested that India limit its Afghan aid and assistance to areas like infrastructure (building highways, roads and government buildings) health (health clinics and doctors) and education (scholarships for Afghan students to study in India) — an area not new in India-Afghan ties. For decades Afghans have studied in India, including President Hamid Karzai and former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah.

India has also trained some Afghan military officers previously at its defense colleges. Trade is a key part of India-Afghan ties, though Pakistan is not keen on allowing transit trade, forcing India and Afghanistan to trade through Iran or Central Asian countries. Indian companies are, however, interested in investing in Afghanistan and a consortium of Indian steel companies led by Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) is in a race with their Chinese counterparts for the Hagijak iron ore mines deal.

While President Karzai’s trip to India has been many months in the making, its timing is critical as it comes in the backdrop of tense ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan, frictions in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and the recent assassination of former Afghan President and head of the Afghan Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani. Mr Rabbani recently visited India in mid-July along with a 15-member delegation and held talks with top Indian officials. During the 1990s, India supported the Northern Alliance parties in Afghanistan and developed close ties not only to Mr Rabbani but to other Afghan leaders.

Both India and Afghanistan are concerned about a significant withdrawal of American and NATO forces from Afghanistan by 2014 and both fear the return of the Taliban. Kabul’s pursuit of a strategic partnership with New Delhi, the first with any country, needs to be seen in this context. In this backdrop, Mr Karzai’s second trip to India in 2011 shows the desire for Afghanistan’s policymakers to build close ties with regional allies in order to prepare for the future. As Mr Karzai stated, “Afghanistan recognizes the danger this region is facing through terrorism and the radicalism that is being used as an instrument of policy against civilians and innocent citizens of our country.”

At the same time, both Kabul and New Delhi realize that ties with Rawalpindi-Islamabad are critical for peace in Afghanistan. This was reflected in President Karzai’s recent statement that instead of speaking with the Taliban, Afghanistan should speak with Pakistan. And in his statement in New Delhi that “Pakistan is our twin brother, India is a great friend. The agreement we signed with our friend will not affect our brother.” This is not the first time President Karzai has made these remarks referring to Pakistan as a twin and India as a friend.

Whether these remarks will reassure Pakistan’s policy makers is a different matter. As veteran Pakistani analyst, Hasan Askari Rizvi remarked “there is so much Indian obsession in Pakistan that with every minor Indian move, there is panic.” Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani’s statement on the India-Afghan pact was that “Both are sovereign countries, they have the right to do whatever they want to.” This reminded one of former Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi’s remarks in 2009 when he said that Pakistan was “not concerned” by close India-U.S. ties as U.S. and Pakistan had been allies for 60 years. Behind these statements, the reality is that of Pakistani concerns about close ties between U.S. and Pakistan’s neighbors — India and Afghanistan — which are perceived in Islamabad-Rawalpindi as being at Pakistan’s expense.

Pakistan has always feared strategic encirclement — the oft-quoted ‘pincer movement’ — if India and Afghanistan develop close ties. In response, Pakistan’s strategists have desired a pro-Pakistan (and anti-India) Afghan government which has led them down the path of seeking proxies, whether mujahideen, Afghan Taliban or the Haqqani network.

Pakistan has no reason to fear close ties between India and Afghanistan, as both countries benefit from and seek a stable, democratic and prosperous Pakistan. However, in trying to prevent India and Afghanistan from building close ties — especially in the economic arena — Pakistan may end up being left behind, instead of being encircled.

Similarly, while U.S. policymakers should be attuned to Pakistan’s concerns, they should not make this a zero sum game where any close strategic ties between India and Afghanistan are not supported simply because of Pakistan. U.S. benefits from close ties between India and Afghanistan and so would Pakistan, if only it took off its blinkered India-centric glasses.

Please click on link above to read journal article

Carey Schofield’s book, Inside the Pakistan Army: A Woman’s Experience on the Frontline of the War on Terror, claims to be a book on the Pakistan army but a more apt description of its subject would be “the world according to Pakistan’s military officers.”

Instead of organizing the book into chapters on the social base of the army, its recruitment policies, promotion, training and doctrine — topics that would define it as a book about the institution — the book covers all these subjects in a single chapter and devotes full chapters to a discussion of the creation of Pakistan, the role of the army, its ideology and its place in Pakistan. There are also separate chapters on Pakistan’s intelligence services, on former Chief of Army General Pervez Musharraf and on the current war in the Pashtun tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

Ms. Schofield’s chapter on the creation of Pakistan reads like a chapter straight out of a Pakistani high school textbook on “Pakistan Studies,” where the invasion of Sindh by Arab-Umayyad General Muhammad Bin Qasim in 711 A.D. is seen as the critical founding step for the later creation of Pakistan. Embracing the ahistorical, ideological paradigm about Pakistan’s origins, the author goes on to describe the Pakistan army’s “narrative” as “a powerful interpretation of the past, possibly more coherent than that of the state itself, which is constantly prey to confused and competing interpretations.” (pg. 31)

Ms. Schofield is not particularly interested in checking out the validity of the narrative or finding out herself whether facts bear it out. While talking about Pakistani national identity and ideology, she claims that Pakistan has “older” ties with Iran than with others countries of the region, especially India. It is true that Pakistan has close historical, cultural and linguistic ties with Iran — and even Pakistan’s national anthem is written in Farsi. But these close ties are shared between Iran and all countries of South Asia, not just Pakistan. India too has very close ties with Iran. The Mughal Empire that ruled from Delhi and the Muslim-ruled Sultanates that preceded it all used Farsi as their official language. Even today, around 20% of India’s Muslims are Shia. Denying Pakistan’s South Asian identity and heritage has created an identity crisis in Pakistan rather than helping create a coherent national narrative.

The author agrees with the view that Pakistan “is beset by enemies” and is “engaged in an existential struggle” with “Bharat” (India). “Hindustan opposed Partition” and is against Pakistan’s “existence and intent upon absorbing Pakistan’s territories into its own republic.” (pg. 19) But she offers no evidence to substantiate her assertions except the fact that she was told so by her Pakistan army hosts.

As an example of India’s ill intent towards Pakistan, Ms. Schofield states that the Indian national anthem “refers possessively to Sindh” referring to the second line of the anthem where Sindh is mentioned along with other regions like Punjab, Gujarat and Maratha. She was clearly not told, or failed to research, the origins of the Indian national anthem, which was originally a poem written by Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore in 1911. Does a poem written almost four decades before Pakistan’s Independence in 1947 really serve as evidence of independent India’s intentions towards Pakistan? Shouldn’t current policy be gleaned from expressions of national policy made by a country’s executive or legislature, not from a poem — even if it is the national anthem? This would be akin to considering the American national anthem, “The Star Spangled Banner,” written by Francis Scott Key in 1814 soon after the war of 1812, as more important for defining American foreign policy than any policy statements by the American president or the Congress.

The book’s argument appears to be that the reason for the dominance of the Pakistan army within Pakistan is not because the army has taken over civilian space through repeated military interventions but because the army was and remains the “only thing that works in the country.” (pg. 13)

Carey Schofield’s willingness to just believe whatever she is told glares at the reader repeatedly throughout the book. On page 48, while talking about the early years of Pakistan’s history, Ms. Schofield asserts that “there was one obvious flaw in the young democracy: the majority of the population lived in East Pakistan, but West Pakistanis would not tolerate a government dominated by Bengalis.” She provides no context for her assertion and does not explain why if the Bengalis were a majority in Pakistan they should not have been accepted as such. Instead she simply buys the explanation that West Pakistan had the right to rule over the eastern wing.

The entire chapter on the Pakistani intelligence services (ISI) is based almost entirely on an interview with one former head of the agency. The chapter is focused on portraying the “correct” image of the ISI, countering criticism both within and outside Pakistan, as well as to find out the “motives” of those who are attacking the agency (pg. 106). While we are provided with a basic idea of the ISI’s internal organizational structure, the aim is to portray the ISI as an agency wrongly blamed by others. No non-ISI army officers or civilians are interviewed for their views and there is no effort to compare the claims of the author’s interviewees with other sources.

It is understandable that a book on the Pakistan army should be primarily based on interviews with army officers. But given the history of the Pakistan army’s political interventions, one would have expected at least some interviews with non-army military officers (for example, those from the Navy or the Air Force) as well as civilian defense analysts. It seems as though Ms Ms. Schofield believes that the only valid view about the Pakistan army is that held within the army, not outside. She makes not even a pretense to talk to others, especially foreigners or Pakistani civilians.

The chapters on the ongoing fight with the militants are interesting more for what they do not say than for what they do. Here again, Ms. Schofield unquestioningly accepts the Pakistan army narrative on Afghanistan, on the Afghan war, and on U.S. policy towards Pakistan. Like the Pakistan army, she repeatedly states that the Pakistan army does not lack intentions, only capabilities, in fighting the militants. There is no attempt to address U.S. concerns about Pakistan’s links with the Taliban and the Haqqani network, or Pakistani Jihadi groups. The prescription is simple: Americans need to help build Pakistan’s capabilities and resources if they want Pakistan to do more.

While discussing the role of religion in the Pakistan army, the author makes it seem as though it is something natural: a Muslim state would by definition have a Muslim army. “All the time, riven through the Army’s thinking and its debates is the influence of religion.” (pg. 14) But if that is the case, what is the explanation of the Pakistan army’s origins being as part of the British Indian army? After all, for over 100 years, officers and men from the areas that now constitute Pakistan served the British, quite often in fighting fellow Muslims both in the sub-continent and in far off places like Iraq, Hijaz, Egypt and Palestine. After failing to address the all-important question of recent ideological indoctrination, Ms. Schofield also does not ask whether an excessive emphasis on religion both in Pakistan’s national identity and within the army helped build ties between the security apparatus and the radical jihadi groups. She simply asserts towards the end of her book that the Pakistan army is “not extreme” and is “not close to jihadis.” (pg. 207-08)

On page 23, while interviewing a three-star general, Ms. Schofield narrates their discussion on religion. The Shia general explained to her the differences between Sunnis and Shias. At the end of the interview when she left with her “handler” Major General Shaukat Sultan (then director general of Inter Services Public Relations), she points out that Major General Sultan was “uncomfortable” and “angry” that the general had discussed the sectarian issue. “He should not have talked to you about being a Shia. Within the army we are all Muslims.” Instead of questioning this line of thought, Ms. Schofield said she agreed with him because “within the army unity is vital.” (pg. 23)

Ironically, Ms. Schofield does not draw from that episode the conclusion that is obvious to any reader: that her access to the army and all her interviews — and hence her book — had been arranged as part of a public relations exercise by the Pakistan army. When the interviewee — in this case the three-star general — did not stick to his script, the head of the army’s public relations was visibly upset.

For any embedded analysis, of the type attempted by Ms. Schofield, the researcher must know enough about the culture, language, history and politics of the country to distinguish plausible perspectives from mere propaganda. Otherwise you end up with simply portraying what the propaganda machine asks you to do, taking away any shred of credibility. It would be akin to writing on the Soviet army during the time of the Soviet Union but under the guidance of the Soviets. Interestingly, Carey Schofield has done that too, and with little impact. Her latest book is not an academic work on the Pakistani army, but a long press release written by a foreigner.

Book Review: Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy
By Ismail Khan

This book review was originally published in the September 2011 issue of Newsline under the headline “Inescapable India.”

A day before this year’s Independence Day, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif grabbed attention when he presented a resplendent portrait of the prospects of India-Pakistan relations. Speaking at a forum of Indian delegates in Lahore, Sharif touched on the commonalities of the two countries. His argument was clear to follow: partitioned from the same land, there was much to share than to lose. When Nawaz Sharif concluded his speech, media commentary followed.

A talk show anchor at a leading TV channel cut out a portion of the speech, juxtaposed it with the speeches of political leaders, and invited a guest to comment on the cowardly behaviour of the country’s leaders. Why would they speak of commonalities with Pakistan’s rival state? asked the anchor. And as was expected, condemnations followed – some against Sharif, others against the TV anchor.

For Aparna Pande, nothing in present times could have strengthened the argument of her dissertation more than the diatribe that followed Sharif’s speech. Her book Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy is subtitled Escaping India.

By “escape,” Pande refers to Pakistan’s “repelling” and even “repulsive” behaviour toward India. Many other scholars, including Pakistani ones, have written on the subject; words like “identity crisis,” “dichotomy,” or “divide within” are commonly used for Pakistan.

Pande espouses that the country has been living in a “virtual location” discarding its shared cultural, linguistic, ethnic and historic ties with India. However, on the flip side, it can be argued that it is the disputes over these ties, both historic and cultural, that made “escape” a policy choice. For Sharif, there is room for shared ties; he even candidly quoted this in the context of the Punjab. For the anchor and her guest, no bond has ever existed between the two countries.

The question that needs to be asked is: Why would Pakistan “escape?” Pande traces it to Pakistan’s justification of being the “other” in the subcontinent from which it was carved out in 1947. Thus, being a mirror-image of India would have put a question mark over Pakistan’s genesis, and hence, for Pande, the elite “consciously” titled Pakistan’s foreign policy as anti-India. This injected ideology is a key – Pande calls it the “third” – determinant of Pakistan’s foreign policy.

Throughout the book, Pakistan can be sensed as having insecurity issues vis-a-vis India. Pande would argue that such feelings explain Pakistan’s foreign policy relations; whether Pakistan allied with the US in the Cold War or after 9/11 – India was the only variable. China, which has border disputes with India, is a more natural ally to Pakistan. Even if Pakistan were to reach out to Papua New Guinea, chances are that India would be supporting the western half of the Oceania Island.

However, there has been a context that fed this insecurity. Even Pande acknowledges that immediately after Partition, statements attributed to the top leadership of Congress and its allies in Pakistani-incorporated areas made the Pakistani elite sceptical of India. India’s desire to re-annex Pakistan, the fear of “Akhand Bharat,” India’s blockade of Pakistan’s water supply – all ignited fears in Pakistani minds.

While Pande may agree with the above observation, what she finds odd is the continued presence of insecurity. For one, all the statements or acts in the initial days are time-bound. She shares examples of how, for instance, even immediately after Partition, Pakistan’s Pashtun nationalist leader expressed his desire to remain with Pakistan contrary to the fear that India would play her cards.

Moreover, being a foreign policy specialist, presently based in the Hudson Institute in Washington DC, Pande may also understand that in many post-colonial states, border disputes have dangled countries on the wall of an insecure pit. Like Pakistan, India too has problems with its neighbours. Many a time, the same fear of encirclement by neighbouring countries is voiced in India as it is in Pakistan. Likewise, how could India’s deployment of troops along the Pakistani border and a bitter history of conflict with Pakistan be justified?

Again, tracing back to the partition of India, Pande asserts that “in the eyes of [Muslim] leaders, the pursuit of parity transformed from that between two political parties, the Indian National Congress and the All Indian Muslim League, into that between two countries, Hindustan and Pakistan.” It is this parity which, she argues, forces Pakistan to see India on equal footing.

While the link from pre- to post-Partition can be followed, her pre-Partition explanation of the parity demand of the Muslim elite in that era would have further strengthened had she added some thoughts on “why” such a demand was voiced. Can “political Islam” be traced back to this? Pande, a Fellow at the Hudson Institute’s Centre on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World, knows the subject well. It is possible that she wanted to retain her exclusive focus on the foreign policy domain.

Overall, the book is easy to follow in style and content; it may mollify the angers of those who are fed up of excessive labelling from every side by TV commentators. However, discarding the book because of the writer’s birth country – India – would compromise one’s intellectual ability to respond fairly. Like it or not, such an approach will also validate Pande’s assertion of Pakistan “escaping India.”

Focused on India: Pakistan’s foreign policy

Reviewed by Huma Yusuf

Books about Pakistan by foreign academics, policymakers, and journalists have recently flooded the market. Many of these have sought to explain – and to some extent apologise for – Pakistan to the western world. As such, these books paint accurate portraits of contemporary Pakistan, relying heavily on anecdote and historical sweeps to do so. Owing to their emphasis on deconstructing the experience of inhabiting present-day Pakistan, these books may be of less interest to Pakistanis who know their country intimately but seek to better understand how it got itself into so much trouble.

To that end, Aparna Pande’s Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India is a worthy read. An accessible academic text, Pande’s book describes the logic and evolution of Pakistan’s foreign policy, showing how much of it is grounded in pre-Partition tensions between the Muslim League and Congress. She shows how India’s Muslim elite constructed an Islamic identity to differentiate themselves from “Hindu” India in order to buttress the two-nation theory.

To some extent, Pande’s task is easy, since few will deny her basic argument that Pakistan’s foreign policy is India-centric. Her choice to revisit the historical underpinnings of that India-centricity is what makes the book an interesting read.

Understanding that history is vital for contemporary Pakistanis. After all, the extent of the threat posed by India is one of the main issues that divide liberals and conservatives in present-day Pakistan. Right-wingers buy into the establishment viewpoint that India is an enduring threat, permanently poised to dismember and undermine Pakistan. Liberals, on the other hand, are increasingly convinced that India recognises the importance, for its own growth, of having a stable and prosperous Pakistan across the border. Speaking at Aligarh Muslim University in January 1948, former Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru put the latter viewpoint best when he said, “I do not want to carry the burden of Pakistan’s great problems. I have enough of my own.”

In light of this divide, most Pakistani readers stand to learn much from Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. Liberals, for instance, will be interested to read the many examples Pande quotes of aggressive statements by right-wing Hindu nationalist organisations in the wake of Partition. In 1949, the RSS raised slogans like, “Pakistan tor do, Nehru hakumat chhor do” (Pakistan should be broken up, Nehru should leave office), which contributed to early Pakistani paranoia about Indian intentions. Similarly, conservatives will learn how other Muslim countries have been closed to Pakistan’s calls for closer cooperation across the much-revered ummah and have historically maintained close ties with India.

The bulk of Pande’s book shows how concerns about India’s hegemonic intentions have driven Pakistan’s foreign policy strategies vis-à-vis Afghanistan, the United States, China, and Middle Eastern (and other Muslim) countries. In each case, she traces developments through the decades, showing how Pakistan’s India-centricity has often been to the detriment of its ties with other countries.

Given Pakistan’s current major foreign policy challenge of finding a political settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan, the chapter on Islamabad’s relations with Kabul is particularly interesting. Many Pakistanis are familiar with the establishment’s fears of encirclement by India, and therefore support close ties with a pro-Pakistan leadership in Kabul. Pande adeptly explains the origins of those fears. For example, she points out how the Afghan demand for an independent Pashtunistan was made in December 1947, even while the Indian army in Kashmir was marching towards the Pakistani border. She also relates how ‘Pashtunistan days’ were celebrated across Indian cities in the late 1940s. Through such examples, Pande nuances her analysis of Pakistan’s foreign policy imperatives towards Afghanistan by showing that, in addition to encirclement, Islamabad fears an India-Afghanistan collaboration to dismember Pakistan by stirring ethno-nationalist movements.

Pande’s analysis is also strongest in the Afghanistan chapter. She shows how Pakistan has tried to strengthen ties with Afghanistan by emphasising a shared, glorious Muslim past, even while rejecting Indian attempts to normalise relations with Pakistan by emphasising a shared South Asian identity. She also highlights an important difference between Pakistan and Afghanistan’s political approaches: while Pakistan aims to eradicate ethnic and geographic difference by celebrating a shared religion, Afghanistan seeks to indulge and manage ethnic and tribal differences to maintain harmony. These contradictory approaches have also strained Pakistan-Afghanistan ties over the years.

The chapter on Pakistan’s foreign policy strategy with regards to the United States is less compelling, only because that history is well-known and regularly rehashed on prime time television. Readers will, however, be interested to find that divergent strategic priorities have always marred the US-Pakistan relationship.

For example, Pande explains that Pakistan joined SEATO in 1954 in the hope that being part of an American-led treaty would protect Pakistan from Indian aggression.

However, from the start, the US clarified that it would only come to Pakistan’s aid in the event of “Communist aggression”.

Pakistan’s inability to differentiate between Communist and other (read: Indian) aggression led to its first disillusionment with the US as an ally. And as is well known, that history has gone on to repeat itself.

The examinations of Pakistan’s ties with China and Middle Eastern countries are more interesting because that history is less well-known. The chapter on China reiterates the fact that Beijing has always prioritised its own national interests in its relations with Pakistan, and stands to gain from all the aid and support it offers Islamabad.

The section on Pakistan’s foreign policy vis-à-vis other Muslim countries offers an even starker wake-up call. Pande describes how, in order to emphasise Pakistan’s Islamic identity, it sought a “virtual relocation” to the Middle East through alliances with Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Pakistan’s right-wing stalwarts would do well to read this chapter and learn how these Muslim countries have remained pragmatic in their dealings with Pakistan, and denied Pakistan’s dreams of a Muslim federation by maintaining ties with India.

There are some points in the book where Pande’s analysis seems weak because she relies on single, one-off quotes from former foreign ministers and international diplomats to provide evidence for trends in Pakistan’s foreign policy. This tactic occasionally makes it seem as if the argument is based on perception rather than ground reality.

One wishes Pande would occasionally go deeper and offer context to explain the motives for particular policy decisions by both Pakistan and India.

For example, in her discussion of Pakistan’s desire for military – and therefore nuclear – parity with India, Pande would have done well to examine further how the India-China dynamic spurs military competition across the region.

That said, Pande’s account is ultimately a balanced review of Pakistan’s foreign policy imperatives that simultaneously justifies Islamabad’s concerns while highlighting the fallout of clinging to them too closely.

The reviewer is a freelance journalist

Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India
(HISTORY)

Aparna Pande

Routledge,

UK
ISBN 0415599008
256

pp. £85

As India takes over the presidency of the UN Security Council for the month of August and Indian strategists and policy makers trumpet this event, it is time to take a deeper look at the challenges facing this 64-year old democracy.

If we look at the political arena we see that the two largest parties seem to be stuck in limbo: Congress struck by corruption scandals and lack of desire on part of current leadership to reform the party from within, BJP still torn between whether it is an ideological movement-cum-party or a political party with an ideology. BJP too is struck with corruption and so while it’s been happy to criticize the government, it also doesn’t want to rock the boat too much because it is not ready to face the electorate with a new agenda.

Half of India’s population is under the age of 20 and this generation is searching for new leadership. However, it is faced with a died-in-the-wool pre-Partition leadership which doesn’t believe it needs to change much in any sphere.

In the economic sphere, two decades ago it was a Congress-led government in which then-Finance Minister Manmohan Singh undertook vast economic changes which resulted in the unshackling of the License Raj economy. The Indian government has often stated that it hopes to use the growing economy to help reduce poverty and spend more money on the social sector. However, in order to do that, the economy has to grow as close to 10 percent as possible. For that, however, India needs to undertake a second phase of reforms.

There is a need to improve food storage and delivery systems which would help ensure that the food and goods stored in warehouses can be used to reduce inflation. While it is great that India’s service sector is growing at such a fast pace, economies need a robust manufacturing sector in order to sustain long-term growth. Further, in a high population country like India, industry needs to be encouraged to move from being capital-intensive to labor-intensive. Hence, changes in labor laws and land acquisition laws need to be undertaken so as to provide the needed incentives. Infrastructure is a key component of the growth of any country and while India has made massive strides in the last decade, there is a lot more that needs to be done.

In speeches over the last seven years, both Prime Minister Singh and his colleagues have referred to the Maoist menace as the greatest internal threat facing India. The majority of state police and paramilitary forces have not been able to reduce the threat despite vast amounts of money and resources being set aside for this purpose. There are states which have been able to deal effectively with the Maoist menace but there is lack of coordination in terms of both information as well as “best practice” strategies.

India also faces insurgencies in the North-East and in Kashmir. Whether it is the Maoist menace or the insurgencies, the Indian state has often preferred to respond with the iron fist. What this policy ignores is that when you are dealing with your own citizens, a multi-pronged strategy which has a security dimension but also political, economic, and social dimensions is preferable and more likely to have a positive long-term impact. There is no intelligence agency in the world that can prevent every terror attack but what is required is to reduce these attacks to a minimum. For that there is a need for more coordination between various government agencies which, again, is lacking in the Indian intelligence sector.

At its core, Indian foreign policy is still driven by the Nehruvian legacy. Just as non-alignment was a key component of that ideology, so was the belief that India was a great civilization and that one day the world would recognize this fact. That the world appears to have accepted India as an emerging power has led to a certain complacency on behalf of the mandarins in the Indian foreign policy establishment. Instead of recognizing that relationships only last if they are worked on, there is a belief that India does not need to do much to maintain its status.

We only have to look at the stalemate in the U.S.-India ties to see that both partners need to reciprocate for a relationship to become what I believe will be the defining partnership of the 21st century. Similarly, India, while being the larger power in South Asia, has not been as magnanimous as it could have been with respect to relations with its neighbors. This is not to say that the neighbors do not need to reciprocate as well, but that India could do more.

Finally, since India is a status quo power, Indian foreign policy has been reactive rather than proactive. Indian leaders need to realize that if the country wants to be treated as a global power, it needs to wield both power and responsibility. India will have to learn to take decisions which may be liked by some of its friends and not liked by others – it will no longer be able to keep everyone happy simply by sitting on the fence. Those who sit on the fence get left behind.

Two days after U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asked India to play a greater role and stated that America viewed Indian leadership in South and Central Asia as being “critically important,” Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani responded by asserting that there was no need for a “chaudhry [chieftain]” in the region and Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar asserted that Pakistan would resist “Indian hegemony.”

This knee-jerk reaction to any attempt at labeling India a big power and tying it into Pakistan’s fear of so-called Indian hegemonic ambitions is consistent Pakistani policy. As I argue in my book, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India, statements such as these can only be understood if we realize that at the core of Pakistan’s security and foreign policy lies the desire for parity with India.

It may be a disturbing trend for those who hope that Pakistan will become a stable democracy. This is because, even today, Pakistan’s foreign policy seems to be dominated by its historic refusal to accept India as being bigger or more powerful. While this policy may have been even partly acceptable during the 1950s-60s, it seems unrealistic today, with India’s fast economic growth and Pakistan lagging behind. How is it possible that Pakistan will achieve today what it could not achieve when the gap was closer?

Pakistan’s leaders have always perceived India as a hegemony-seeking neighbor and believed that it is only when Pakistan achieves military parity with India will it be able to resolve all issues, including Kashmir. In 1954, then Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra stated, “When there is more equality of military strength [between India and Pakistan], then I am sure that there will be a greater chance of settlement.” In an interview in January 1980 General Zia ul Haq, head of Pakistan’s army and military ruler from 1977-1988, said that Pakistan would like “equality” to be the “determining factor” in any India-Pakistan relationship. In March 2009, Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani stated that any internal instability in Pakistan could prompt an Indian attack on Pakistan. Prime Minister Gilani stated: “When seen with the widening force differential between ours and Indian armed forces, it explains to us New Delhi’s emboldened posture and its urge to find space for a conventional war.”

This desire for parity with India led Pakistan’s leaders to seek allies who would provide aid and assistance. Pakistan has always seen the United States as the ally who would provide assistance to help Pakistan gain parity with India, and ensure its safety and integrity against any Indian attack. Soon after the end of the 1965 war, during a discussion with American Ambassador McConaughy, then Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto insisted that Pakistan had proved this equality in the 1965 war and now it was incumbent upon India to recognize this equal status.

In a discussion with American embassy officials in January 1972 then head of Pakistan’s Army Lt. Gen. Gul Hasan asked for American aid in order to maintain the army “at pre-war size.” When asked by the Americans if this would be possible, keeping in mind both the reduction in size of the Pakistani territory and elimination of the need to now maintain a force in East Pakistan, Gul Hasan’s answer was that “a credible force would still be needed to serve as deterrent against any hostile intentions by India.”

Right from 1947, Pakistan’s leaders, in addition to seeking American support, have viewed any close ties between India and U.S. as antithetical to Pakistan’s interests. During President Eisenhower’s trip to Pakistan in December 1959, General Ayub tried to impress upon his American counterpart that America should not provide any aid to India, because “Nehru still wants Pakistan to remain weak while India builds its strength.”

During his visit to South Asia in May 1961, Vice President Lyndon Johnson asked Prime Minister Nehru “to extend his leadership to other areas in Southeast Asia.” Pakistan’s government issued a protest in response. A few days later, while on his way to Washington, General Ayub stated, “if India became too powerful her smaller Asian neighbors would have to seek China’s protection and that China would respond favorably to such a move.” This has been a constant theme in Pakistan’s relations with the U.S. Every time the U.S. tilts towards India or applies pressure on Pakistan, Pakistan reiterates its close ties with China. Soon after the killing of Osama Bin Laden in early May 2011, Prime Minister Gilani visited China in attempt to demonstrate that Pakistan had a strong ally who would help build Pakistan.

At the start of President Carter’s term, according to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the focus of the administration’s policy was one of building ties with “regional influentials,” and in South Asia that meant India. Hence, Secretary Clinton’s speech urging India to play its role in Asia-Pacific is not a new policy. It comes in a long line of statements and policies held by successive American administrations.

Pakistan desires parity with a much larger neighbor draining most of its resources without providing the security Pakistanis crave. At some time, Pakistan has to decide whether what has not happened in 64 years is still possible today. There were people in Pakistan during the 1950s-60s who did not mind American hegemony as long as it was not Indian. Today, there are those who are fine with Chinese hegemony, but not Indian.

What Pakistan’s leaders fail to acknowledge is that India is the major power in South Asia. Other countries in South Asia may often resent Big Brother India and U.S. and India may have differing views on many issues. However, India’s size, economic power, military power and soft power will ensure that it is treated as a big power, both in South Asia and globally.